We study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare, focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations. In a representative-agent model of …scal federalism, fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax-setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare. If, however, tax-setting authorities pursue revenue maximization, fragmentation, by pushing down equilibrium tax rates, may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare. We exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous Swiss …scal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these e¤ects. While for purely direct-democratic jurisdictions (which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting)
Introduction
Is tax competition good or bad for the wellbeing of society? This has been a question of concern to federal states for as long as taxpayers have been free to settle in whatever part of their country they pleased. And as lucrative tax bases are becoming ever more mobile across national borders too, this issue is fast rising towards the top of the international policy agenda.
The main opposing arguments are straightforward. Advocates of tax harmonization think of governments as essentially benevolent maximizers of social welfare, whose ability to o¤er the optimum level of public goods is undermined by the erosion of their tax base. Conversely, those who view tax competition as a force for good consider governments as self-interested revenue maximizers, whose voracity may be constrained by tax competition. These are stock arguments in debates concerning tax coordination, such as on the taxation of e-commerce across US states, on harmonization of value added taxes and corporate taxes in the European Union, or on the de…nition of "harmful tax competition" by the OECD.
Research in this area abounds. 1 Economic theory provides elegant statements of the conditions under which tax competition may be a force for good or a force for bad. Edwards and Keen (1996) , for example, show that the net welfare e¤ect of tax competition hinges on the relative magnitude of two parameters: the marginal excess burden of taxation and the government's marginal ability to divert tax revenue for its own uses. Such parameters, however, elude precise measurement. Empirical work has therefore focused on indirect approaches, based on observable variables. The most prominent strategy, initiated by Oates (1972 Oates ( , 1985 , is to study the relationship between government size and "decentralization", where decentralization is understood alternatively as the share of sub-federal government in consolidated revenues or expenditure (centralism), or as the number of sub-federal governments (fragmentation). 2 This approach draws its working hypothesis from Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) description of governments as revenue-maximizing Leviathans, whose tax raising powers could be held in check by decentralization. Negative partial correlations between government size and decentralization were therefore interpreted as evidence in support of the Leviathan view, and, implicitly at least, of the conjecture that tax competition is a force for good. It has come to be recognized, however, that this approach faces a major identi…cation problem, because negative partial correlations between government size and decentralization are also predicted by a model of horizontal tax competition among fully benevolent governments -in which case tax competition is welfare reducing. 3 Hence, regressing government size on decentralization does not allow conjectures on underlying government objectives or on the welfare consequences of tax competition. Recognizing the interpretational ambiguity besetting much of the existing empirical literature, Nechyba (2004, p. 2463) note that "the work stimulated by
Oates addresses the issue of whether spending falls with increased competition, but does not address the issue of whether resources are used more e¢ciently as competition increases". Similarly, Wilson and Wildasin (2004) conclude their survey with the observation that "more work is needed to incorporate reasonable political processes into tax competition models, leading to sharper empirical distinctions between good and bad tax competition".
In this paper we seek to advance towards that aim through two main contributions. First, we address the di¢culty of distinguishing good from bad tax competition in a way that is tied rigorously to the theory. We derive a reduced-form relationship which involves only observable variables and maps monotonically into welfare e¤ects, drawing on a model of …scal federalism in the vein of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) . In this model too, the di¤erence between welfare-improving and welfare-reducing tax competition hinges on largely unobservable structural parameters. However, we can establish the following simple prediction: if the relationship between states' "smallness" and the equilibrium state tax rate is positive for states that have relatively benevolent governments, and if, other things equal, this same relationship turns negative for states that have less benevolent governments, then the latter e¤ect can be interpreted as evidence of welfare-increasing "Leviathan taming" in these states. The intuition is straightforward. The smaller a state , the less it internalizes the externalities created by its choice of tax rate on the tax base of other jurisdictions, both horizontally (i.e. for the other states in the federation, whose tax base shrinks if state  lowers its tax rate) and vertically (i.e.
for the federal government, whose tax base increases if state  lowers its tax rate). Smallness therefore exacerbates distortions created by externalities. Dominant horizontal externalities lead to state taxes that are too low, while vertical externalities push towards state taxes that are too high. If smallness is positively correlated with state tax rates set by relatively benevolent governments, this implies that the dominating externality pushes towards equilibrium state taxes that are too high. If smallness is at the same time negatively correlated with tax rates among Leviathan states, all else equal, this implies that smallness (i.e. tax competition) must be a good thing for the citizens of those states, as it countervails both their governments' intrinsic desire to overtax and the externalities pushing towards excessively high taxes.
An empirical evaluation of this prediction requires extraneous information on the benevolence of government. Our second main contribution is to exploit an empirical setting that allows us to distinguish a priori between government objectives across jurisdictions. We compile a detailed new data set of local taxation in Switzerland, which o¤ers a propitious laboratory for research on tax competition thanks to the exceptional institutional diversity and …scal autonomy of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. With its three hierarchically nested layers of government (central, cantonal and municipal), Switzerland can be considered a federation of federations, thus allowing identi…cation from variation between as well as within federations (cantons). Another feature of the Swiss data is that they allow us to classify jurisdictions by the benevolence of their governments, where we associate benevolence with the intensity of direct-democratic control in matters of local taxation. We thereby have empirical measures for all the variables that appear in the theoretical prediction we wish to test.
We estimate the impact of government benevolence on the relationship between local tax rates and the relative smallness of jurisdictions, controlling for di¤erences in revenue needs, locational attractiveness and systemic idiosyncrasies. A GMM estimator is employed to allow for unobserved spatial dependence. We …nd that, if they have benevolent governments, relatively smaller jurisdictions set higher equilibrium tax rates, but that this relationship is reversed in jurisdictions with greater scope for governmental revenue maximization. Hence, our estimation results coincide with the theoretical prediction. Our empirical speci…cation allows us to interpret this …nding as evidence that tax competition lowers equilibrium taxes because governments are Leviathans, and the underlying theory identi…es this as evidence of bene…cial tax competition. We thereby overcome the interpretational ambiguity of prior empirical work.
Our paper contributes to some additional issues raised in the literature. One recurrent theme in empirical research following Oates (1985) concerns the appropriate de…nition of "decentralization", the metric for the intensity of tax competition. We plead in favor of the fragmentation version: while, to the extent that governments are benevolent, relative sizes of federal and subfederal government budgets are endogenous, the number of jurisdictions, and thus the relative size of a representative jurisdiction, can more plausibly be treated as exogenous with respect to citizens' …scal preferences. 4 We therefore model the intensity of tax competition via di¤erences in states' smallness, in terms of their population shares, and we treat the …scal share of the subfederal government level as an endogenous variable.
By allowing for …scal interdependencies not only among same-level governments but also among di¤erent hierarchically nested government layers, our analysis furthermore takes account of the fact that the standard model of purely horizontal tax competition is increasingly inappropriate as a framework for analyzing non-coordinated tax setting in many real-world contexts. Both …scal decentralization from national to sub-national governments and (to an as yet lesser extent) delegation of …scal competencies from national governments to supranational institutions are evident global trends. 5 The con…guration studied in this paper is therefore not speci…c to the Swiss case. In general, vertical externalities are more likely to dominate the smaller is the sub-federal …scal share. Average revenues of our subfederal jurisdictions (municipalities) amount to some 70% of corresponding federal (canton) revenues, which is a relatively high sub-federal …scal share in international comparison. 6 The scope for vertical externalities should therefore be rather greater in many other federations. In addition, even the "Leviathan" governments in our Swiss data are subject to direct-democratic controls via voluntary referendums, which means that elected o¢cials still enjoy comparatively little leeway to pursue their self-serving aims. Other nations' sub-federal jurisdictions likely exhibit greater scope both for both vertical externalities and revenue maximization than Swiss municipalities, and hence our results imply that there is even greater scope for Leviathan-taming tax competition in many other federations. 4 Fragmentation represents the standard approach for modelling the intensity of tax competition in theories of …scal federalism and Leviathan governments (see, e.g., Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2003; Eggert and Sørensen, 2008) . We consider the possibility of endogenous jurisdictional smallness in our estimations. Note that our de…nition of jurisdictional fragmentation di¤ers from the fragmentation of the budgetary process in a single jurisdiction, studied e.g. by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) . 5 See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on …scal decentralization. 6 According to taxpolicycenter.org, 2006 US state own-source tax revenue corresponded to some 40% of federal tax revenue, while the relative size of of local tax revenue to state tax revenue ranged from 18% (Vermont) to 115% (Florida).
Finally, our study is related to a growing literature that seeks to establish how di¤erent democratic institutions shape policy outcomes. The impact of direct democracy represents one of the key themes in this research area. In a comprehensive survey of this literature, Besley and Case (2003, p. 45) put the central insight as follows: "the possibility of initiatives forces greater agreement between voter preferences and policy outcomes, assuming that representatives elected to the legislature have views that are out of step with the citizens at large". In the same vein, Matsusaka (2005) concludes that "direct democracy works", precisely because it mitigates agency problems between voters and potentially Leviathan governments. Gerber (1996) and Besley and Coate (2000) model how the availability of direct-democratic instruments will push policy outcomes towards the preferences of the median voter. This proposition is supported empirically by Gerber (1999) and Matsusaka (2004 Matsusaka ( , 2007 , based on extensive analyses of US data. 7 Our contribution is to explore the e¤ect of direct democracy on local taxation via its interaction with …scal externalities. This causal link has not, to our knowledge, been studied before.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model underlying our analysis and presents the estimable predictions. In Section 3, we discuss our estimation strategy and describe the empirical setting. Regression results are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 o¤ers a concluding summary and discussion.
Theory

Leviathan taming in a …scal federation
The theoretical framework informing our estimation strategy is a "small open federation" variant of the model developed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) . We allow for heterogeneous government objectives and state sizes while retaining the assumptions that private agents hold identical preferences and that there is a single mobile tax base. The details of the model are presented in Appendix A. Here, we o¤er a verbal summary of its main features and of the testable prediction used to identify welfare-improving Leviathan-taming tax competition empirically.
We consider a federation with a central government and  …scally autonomous sub-federal states . These states are alike in all respects bar their size and their governments' preferences.
The single taxable production factor is perfectly mobile among states as well as between the federation and the outside world. States share an identical production technology featuring decreasing returns. Owners of the production factor consider returns on their factor from within and from outside the federation as imperfect substitutes, which implies that equilibrium rates of return will be equalized among states but might di¤er between the federation and the rest of the world.
The federal and state governments tax the production factor at rates  and   respectively.
Tax receipts are transformed into publicly provided goods, from which residents derive positive utility. 8 State governments can be (a) purely benevolent, in which case their objective function coincides with citizens' utility function, (b) pure Leviathans, in which case their only objective is to maximize tax receipts, or (c) they can hold intermediate preferences, where the Leviathan parameter   2 [0 1] represents the weight they attribute to revenue maximization. 9 Equilibrium state tax rates  ¤  are suboptimal from the point of view of citizens except for knife-edge con…gurations. Since all …scal externalities intensify as states get smaller, we take the relative "smallness" of states (de…ned as one minus their population share in the federation) as a metric for the intensity of tax competition. We can identify four e¤ects that determine the equilibrium level of state tax rates relative to the social optimum    : ² a Leviathan e¤ect, which pushes up   for all state sizes (as higher   implies greater government appetite for tax revenues), ² a horizontal tax externality, which pushes down   as states get smaller (the standard "race to the bottom" e¤ect), 8 This model abstracts from vertical transfers. Below we show that transfers are essentially negligible in our empirical application. 9 Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) model the Leviathan by assuming that some exogenously given fraction of tax revenues are used for expenditure that bene…ts only the government itself. Adopting this modeling approach would not change our main results. Eggert and Sørensen (2008) represent Leviathans as pursuing vote maximization through rents o¤ered to public-sector employees, who have a positive weight in the social welfare function. It turns out that this leads to qualitatively equivalent conclusions regarding the desirability of horizontal tax competition to those identi…ed by Edwards and Keen (1996) and therefore to those implied in our model as well.
² a vertical tax externality, which pushes up   as states get smaller (as smaller states internalize to a lesser extent the positive externality they bestow upon the federal government via low   ), and ² a tax exporting e¤ect, which pushes   up or down depending on whether a particular state is an importer or an exporter of the mobile factor (as the tax burden may or may not be imposed on out-of-state residents).
It can be shown that, with purely benevolent governments, intensi…ed tax competition via smaller state size will reduce welfare, irrespective of the dominant tax externality. 10 However, even the parsimonious model studied here does not allow for analytical results on the welfare implications of state size for positive values of the Leviathan parameter. 11 This re ‡ects the di¢culty of linking (observable) tax e¤ects of changing state size to (unobservable) welfare e¤ects, which in turn represents the central intellectual challenge this paper seeks to address.
We can, however, identify a mapping from tax e¤ects of state sizes to welfare in one particular con…guration. This mapping is established through two propositions and a conjecture. 12 Proposition 1 Suppose that, for a given level of Leviathan government preferences (  = ), intensi…ed tax competition implied by smaller state size leads to higher equilibrium tax rates.
In that case tax competition is unambiguously welfare reducing.
The logic of this result is as follows. If equilibrium tax rates rise as states get smaller, this must mean that vertical tax externalities dominate the horizontal tax externalities, as they are the only force pushing towards higher taxes as states get smaller. Combined with the tendency of Leviathans to overtax irrespective of state size, this implies suboptimally high state tax rates.
Proposition 2 Suppose Proposition 1 holds for an interior value   1. Then there exists a pivotal level  ¤   , above which intensi…ed tax competition implied by smaller state size leads to lower equilibrium tax rates.
1 0 This mirrors the result of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) . The formal proof of this result in our speci…c setting can be provided on request. 1 1 One exception should be noted. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) show that tax competition between purely Leviathan governments is unambiguously welfare improving in the special case where federal and state-level public goods are perfect substitutes. 1 
This conjecture is based on extensive simulations reported in Appendix B. It is the main result informing our empirics, as it allows us to make welfare statements based on observed relationships between tax rates, state sizes and government types.
Conjecture 1 states that the fall in equilibrium tax rates beyond the pivotal level of Leviathanism,  ¤  , will be welfare enhancing for all state sizes. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which plots the deviation of equilibrium state tax rates from their optimum (  ¡    ) against di¤erent levels of smallness. 13 When governments are purely benevolent (  = 0) and there is only one sub-federal state, the state tax rate is optimal (  =    ). Negative correlations between tax rates and smallness have sometimes collectively been interpreted as evidence of Leviathan taming. It turns out that taxes fall in smallness irrespective of government preferences in all cases where horizontal externalities dominate. In those con…gurations, increasing smallness (i.e. tax competition) can be a good or a bad thing, depending on whether   is above or below    . Traditionally, regressions of government size on decentralization were (at least implicitly) predicated on the assumption that   is above    , but this is not something that can be ascertained empirically. Hence the usefulness of the case where equilibrium tax rates rise in smallness for   up to a pivotal level  ¤  , but fall in smallness for   above  ¤  . In that case, Conjecture 1 states that smallness (i.e. tax competition) is an unambiguous force for good for all     ¤  , as   is monotonically lowered by increasing smallness towards    , but   never falls below    , i.e. the equilibrium tax rate under dominant vertical externalities is never lower than the …rst-best tax rate   . In terms of Figure 1 , Conjecture 1 is equivalent to stating that © will not lie below the horizontal axis. 
Fragmentation
The key variable driving the intensity of tax externalities in our model is the relative smallness of states, whereas the related empirical literature uses two di¤erent exogenous variables, fragmentation and centralism.
Our de…nition of smallness can be taken as a measure of fragmentation, because, from the point of view of a representative state, a fragmented federation implies relatively small states. The model clearly shows that observed inverse relationships between tax rates and fragmentation are not su¢cient to infer Leviathan governments. However, it also o¤ers an analytically rigorous version of the popular view that intensi…ed competition from increased fragmentation can "tame the Leviathan" (without constraining it excessively), provided that vertical externalities dominate when state governments are relatively benevolent.
The empirical Leviathan literature has paid considerable attention to centralism, i.e. the allocation of …scal powers between the federal and state government levels. This is represented by the ratio of federal and state-level expenditures, which, with balanced budgets, is related (albeit not necessarily equal) to the ratio of average tax rates  . The parameters that determine the equilibrium state tax rate and the equilibrium federal tax rate will also determine the ratio  . This means that equilibrium level of centralism depends in part on citizens' …scal preferences. Unlike fragmentation, the degree of centralism should not therefore be considered as an exogenous determinant of the intensity of tax competition. 14 What about the exogeneity of smallness? Jurisdictional de…nitions may be endogenous with respect to taxation in certain settings (Perroni and Scharf, 2001 ), especially in the context of single-purpose districts (Hoxby, 2000) . Our analysis is based on general-purpose jurisdictions with historically predetermined boundaries, such that jurisdictions' size in geographic terms can reasonably be taken as exogenous. Smallness in population terms, however, may in reality be to some extent in ‡uenced by tax rates. We return to this issue in the empirical part.
3 Empirical setting
The regression model
The model of …scal federalism described above implies: 15
where  again indexes states,  denotes di¤erent federations,   represents smallness, and 1 4 See also Wilson and Janeba (2005) , who study how the choice of  may be used strategically by the central government to minimize the distortions arising from the interplay of horizontal and vertical tax externalities. Note that, notwithstanding our assumption (spelt out in Appendix A) that  is independent of the distribution of investor-…rms across states,  is likely to be in ‡uenced by . 1 5 Speci…cally, see equations (7) and (11) If underlying state government objectives (  ) are measurable, the natural empirical speci…cation becomes:
where  ¡ is a weighted average of neighboring state tax rates, and   is a stochastic disturbance.
The estimated coe¢cient b According to Conjecture 1, if b
we can infer that tax competition tames the Leviathan and increases social welfare. We call this "strong Leviathan taming": sti¤er tax competition from increased smallness improves welfare in Leviathan states.
Another possible parameter con…guration is b
. We refer to this as "weak Leviathan taming". In this case, sti¤er tax competition from increased smallness is less harmful in Leviathan states than in relatively benevolent states.
Some additional issues:
² Governments are unlikely to admit that they do not pursue citizens' welfare, hence   is not directly observed. Our basic assumption is that decisions in municipalities with greater scope for direct democratic participation in the tax setting process are more likely to correspond to the benevolent policy, whereas more indirect democratic control 1 6 For our empirical purposes, we treat  as a dummy variable, setting the lower-bound value  equal to zero.
o¤ers greater leeway to Leviathan governments. 17 ² Estimation of (2) requires variation in   and in   (). This is most likely to be found in a comparison of multiple federations, which ideally should be similar to each other in all other relevant respects. Note that for the identi…cation of the e¤ect illustrated in Figure 1 , we do not need to observe the full spectrum of   , but only some instances of
² The theoretical model assumes states to be identical except for their size. Empirical estimation needs to control for relevant asymmetries across states, such as revenue needs, preferences for public goods, tax base elasticities and locational advantages. Hence, state-level control variables X  are included in (2).
² The reduced-form con…guration we seek to take to the data is independent of the way the federal tax rate is set. 18 However, the federal tax rate   is unlikely to be independent from state tax rates -be it via strategic interactions between the two governments levels, or through state-and federation-speci…c exogenous features that drive both  and  .
Likewise,   and  ¡ will be interdependent. Such interdependence could for instance be the result of yardstick competition, whereby citizens of a jurisdiction inform their choices by observing tax decision in surrounding jurisdictions. We will address this issue by instrumenting   and  ¡ .
²   could be spatially correlated in a way that is not explained by the model, i.e. via spatial dependence among   . We therefore use the spatial GMM estimator proposed by Conley (1999) , which applies a distance weighting up to some bound to the o¤-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix while allowing us to keep instrumenting the endogenous regressors. 19 ² We consider the inclusion of federations' centralization ratios as an additional control variable, by way of a robustness check and for comparability with the relevant empirical 1 7 This assumption …nds strong theoretical and empirical support -see the references to the relevant literature in the Introduction. 1 8 Note that the vertical externalities considered in our model are of the "bottom-up" type: …scal choices of sub-federal states are a¤ected by the existence of a federal layer, irrespective of the strategic interaction between governements at di¤erent hierarchical levels. 1 9 We choose a distance bound of 15 km. Sensitivity tests show the value of this bound to be unimportant for our qualitative results. literature (but without being warranted by the theory). Centralization is measured as the ratio of state revenues to consolidated (state + federal) revenues. In view of the evident endogeneity issue, we instrument this variable.
² We express all non-dichotomous variables in natural logs, so that the estimated coe¢-cients can be interpreted as elasticities.
Switzerland: a laboratory for research on tax competition
Although the reduced-form predictions we seek to put to the test could conceivably also be estimated on data for other federal systems, Switzerland presents a particularly propitious empirical setting. The Swiss …scal constitution distinguishes three largely autonomous jurisdictional layers (national, cantonal and municipal). Each jurisdictional layer collects a roughly equal share of total tax revenues. 20 We will concentrate on the cantonal and municipal levels.
Direct taxation at both these levels of government encompasses four conventional tax bases: personal income and wealth, and corporate income and capital. 21 Personal income is by far the most important tax base, accounting for over 70% of municipal and over 60% of cantonal tax revenues. Summary statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2. Several institutional features make Switzerland particularly well suited to our study: ² Multiple federations: The three-tier …scal constitution implies that Switzerland can be considered as a federation of federations. We will take cantons to represent the federations () of our empirical model, while municipalities represent the states ( ). Switzerland is divided into 26 cantons, which in turn contain between 3 (Basel Stadt) and 404 (Berne) municipalities. 22 ² Di¤erent degrees of direct democracy: There is substantial variation across municipalities and cantons in the intensity of direct democratic involvement in the tax setting process.
Measures of this intensity serve as our proxy for   . We distinguish three categories:
"assembly" municipalities that set taxes via show of hands at town hall meetings of 2 0 Over our sample period 1985-2001, revenue shares have remained fairly constant at some 30, 40 and 30 percent for the national, cantonal and municipal government levels, respectively . 2 1 In contrast to many other countries, property taxation is small even at the local level. 2 2 These numbers refer to 1995. The total number of municipalities is in slow decline, as micro-municipalities (some with populations below 100) are encouraged to merge. Since our sample includes 131 relatively large municipalities, such changes do not a¤ect our data. For example, the highest municipal income tax rate recorded in our database exceeds the lowest one by a factor of …ve, for a given level of income (see also the standard deviations reported in Table 2 ).
² Small transfers: Although vertical and horizontal …scal transfers do exist in Switzerland, they are small. According to national statistics, net average vertical transfers represent less than 2 percent, and net horizontal transfers less than 4 percent, of total municipal revenue.
Data
We have collected a panel data set of municipal and cantonal tax rates and control variables for the years 1985, 1991, 1995, 1998 and 2001 . The dataset covers up to 130 municipalities.
The information underlying our categorization of municipalities by degree of direct democracy in …scal matters is taken from a survey conducted in the mid-1990s. 23 Among our sample municipalities, 38 are identi…ed as assembly municipalities, 36 as referendum municipalities and 56 Leviathan municipalities. We construct two alternative dummy variables, denoted by e , and their associated data samples. In the "referendum sample", the dummy variable is set to 0 for all assembly or referendum municipalities, and to 1 for the remaining (Leviathan) municipalities. In the "assembly sample", the dummy variable is set to 0 only for the assembly municipalities, while the referendum municipalities are dropped. Hence, the assembly sample has a smaller number of observations but a larger implied distance between e  = 0 and e  = 1.
e  exhibits useful variance, as it di¤ers among many same-canton municipalities as well as between cantons: while the total sample standard deviation of e  is 0.49 (referendum sample, see Table 1 ), the within-canton standard deviation still amounts to 0.30.
Since e  features as a regressor in our empirical model, it is implicitly assumed to be an exogenous feature. As pointed out e.g. by Besley and Case (2003) , institutions are ultimately endogenous too. e  could depend on, or be simultaneously determined with,  in two evident ways. On the one hand, local communities might push for more direct democracy if delegated governments chronically overspend, in which case high (lagged)  is associated with low e . On the other hand, the predominantly conservative mentality of certain local electorates could simultaneously induce lower  and a lower e . One way to address this issue would be to draw on intertemporal changes in decision-making institutions, and to control for lagged and time-invariant location speci…c e¤ects. Democratic institutions, however, have a habit of being highly persistent. No changes in the decision-making systems of our sample municipalities had occurred at least up to 2000 (Micotti and Bützer, 2003) . Additional evidence on the stability over time of direct democratic institutions in Swiss cantons is provided by Feld and Matsusaka (2003) . The durability of the institutional structure to some extent mitigates concerns about endogeneity. Moreover, the controls in our regression models capture the main fault lines in Swiss political culture (di¤erent language groups, young versus old voters, rural versus urban regions, and low-lying versus mountain regions). 24 Since most municipalities set a single multiplier on the cantonal tax schedule, our main focus is on a revenue-weighted average of standardized versions of a representative set of e¤ective tax rates. We call this aggregate the "tax index ". Both municipal and cantonal tax indices have mean zero by construction. Speci…cally, the tax index is constructed as the revenue weighted mean of e¤ective average tax rates for nine representative tax payers, covering both personal income and wealth and corporate income and capital. 25 The smallness of a municipality is de…ned relative to its canton as   = 1¡
, where   is the population of municipality  in canton , and   is the respective cantonal population.
For the population measures, we consider only residents with Swiss citizenship, since what we seek to represent is municipalities' political weight in the canton.
A range of control variables are included in all estimated equations (see Table 1 for summary statistics).
² Theory suggests that we should control for the respective cantonal tax rates, the equivalent of  . In addition, we control for the spatially weighted tax rates of other municipalities,  ¡ , so as to capture direct strategic interactions among municipalities.  ¡ is constructed as the average tax index of all municipalities excluding , weighted by the inverse of the square of their euclidean distance from . 26 Both these variables are instrumented via two-stage least squares with three identifying canton-level variables, the canton population living in urban areas, cantonal area and the canton's number of municipalities. The instrument sets furthermore include spatially weighted averages of all exogenous municipality-level variables. 2 4 Feld and Matsusaka (2003) , in regressions at canton level, furthermore control for the parliamentary strength of left-wing parties, to control for "ideology"; and they instrument  . Neither of these extensions a¤ects their results in any substantial way. 2 5 We used ANOVA to characterize the levels and shapes of tax schedules with a parsimonious set of representative tax payers. Three representative cases were identi…ed to describe tax schedules on personal income, two cases were identi…ed for wealth taxes, three cases were identi…ed for corporate income taxes, and one case was identi…ed for capital taxes. See Brülhart and Jametti (2006) for further details. 2 6 Application of linear spatial weights changes none of our qualitative …ndings. We prefer square weights given previous …ndings on spatial decay functions based on intra-national migration (e.g. Schwartz, 1973) and commuting (e.g. Harsman and Quigley, 1998) . Note that these control variables may also capture horizontal tax-competition e¤ects that transgress canton borders.
² Further controls are warranted to allow for di¤erences in municipalities' public revenue needs. We include regressors measuring municipal population, the share of population under 20, the share of population over 65, municipal area, and a dummy for municipalities that represent urban centers. Municipal area captures two e¤ects: it implies revenue needs for transport and communication services, and it is strongly positively correlated with the mountainousness of municipalities.
² Variables are added to control for di¤erences in municipalities' locational attractiveness, and thus their inherent appeal to potential tax payers: distance to the nearest freeway, distance to the nearest international airport, and length of lake shore within the municipality.
² A dummy for the Latin (i.e. French and Italian speaking) cantons controls attitudinal di¤erences between those cantons and the German speaking majority.
² Although most municipalities enjoy complete autonomy in setting their tax rates, there are some exceptions. Five of the 26 cantons have harmonized municipal tax rates on corporate income and capital, whilst leaving municipalities' freedom to set personal taxes unconstrained. We therefore include a dummy that equals one for the relevant cantons and taxes. 27 
Results
Baseline regressions
Our baseline spatial GMM estimation results of the empirical model (2) are shown in Table   3 , separately for the referendum de…nition and for the assembly de…nition of e . In order to facilitate the comparison of e¤ect sizes, we also report standardized (beta) coe¢cients. The diagnostic tests for overidentifying restrictions and weak instruments, reported in the last three rows of Table 3 , are satisfactory.
We …rst concentrate on the results based on the referendum de…nition (…rst results column of Table 3 ), which encompasses our full data set. The model performs well. All statistically signi…cant coe¢cients on the control variables conform with expectations: urban centers and remote municipalities (measured by distance to the nearest airport) have relatively high taxes;
while municipalities with long lake shores and those located in the Latin regions have relatively low taxes. 28 The positive coe¢cient on spatially weighted tax rates of surrounding municipalities suggests that tax rates are strategic complements, consistent with our theoretical assumption.
Our main parameters of interest are those represented in the …rst three rows of the table.
We …nd the main e¤ect of smallness to be positive (although not statistically signi…cant).
This is consistent with the scenario underlying Propositions 1 and 2: for relatively benevolent municipalities (e  = 0), vertical externalities dominate (
Our estimation also con…rms that direct-democratic …scal powers represent a valid proxy variable for revenue maximization: the coe¢cient on the Leviathan dummy (e ) is statistically signi…cantly positive. This means that at the point where smallness is zero, i.e. where intracantonal tax competition cannot exist, less direct-democratic municipalities have signi…cantly higher average tax rates than more direct-democratic ones. The size of this e¤ect is considerable, as it implies that, without intra-cantonal tax competition, Leviathan municipalities' average tax rate is 45 percent (=  037 ¡ 1) higher than that of otherwise identical benevolent municipalities. 30 Our third and most important empirical result is that we …nd a negative coe¢cient on the interaction variable between e  and smallness. Hence, greater scope for Leviathan government reduces the tax-raising e¤ect of smallness. Stated in reverse: fragmentation, while yielding ine¢ciently high equilibrium tax rates for benevolent municipalities, acts as a counterweight to the desire for high taxes on the part of Leviathan municipalities. The coe¢cient on the interaction between e  and smallness being larger in absolute value than the coe¢cient on smallness suggests the presence of what we have termed "strong Leviathan taming", which in turn implies that fragmentation is (second-best) welfare improving in so far as the Leviathan municipalities are concerned. In a statistical sense based on a Wald test of b
however, we cannot reject the null that Leviathan taming is merely of the "weak" form:
sti¤er tax competition induced by increased smallness is at least less harmful for Leviathan municipalities than for benevolent municipalities.
The second data column of Table 3 displays results for regressions with the narrower de…nition of "benevolence", where e  is set to zero only for municipalities that make …scal decision via a vote by an assembly of the entire citizenry, and municipalities with intermediate (i.e. referendum based) systems are left out. We observe that this changes our main results in the expected way. The coe¢cient on smallness increases by a factor of more than three and becomes statistically signi…cant. The main e¤ect of the Leviathan dummy is again statistically signi…cantly positive, and its magnitude is considerably larger, which is in line with the starker di¤erence between e  = 0 and e  = 1 under the assembly de…nition. The estimated coe¢cient implies that a municipality which faces no intra-cantonal tax competition will raise its tax rate by fully 148 percent (=  091 ¡ 1) if it switches from a system based on compulsory …scal referenda to a system with delegated …scal authority. Our main interest again concerns the slope-shifting e¤ect of e . This coe¢cient increases by a factor of 2.4 (from -2.95 to -7.19), and it remains statistically signi…cantly negative. The interaction e¤ect also remains larger in absolute terms than the main e¤ect of smallness, which is consistent with strong Leviathan taming, although this di¤erence again is not statistically signi…cant. The results obtained for the assembly de…nition con…rm those found in the larger data set underlying the referendum de…nition, and they are somewhat crisper still. This is in line both with our mapping of decision-making systems to  and with the predictions of the theory, as the institutional distance between e  = 0 and e  = 1 is larger with the assembly de…nition than with the referendum de…nition.
Extensions
We consider a number of extension to the benchmark estimations of Table 3 , concentrating on the full data sample based on the referendum de…nition.
First, we consider a number of alternative speci…cations using spatial GMM. One might reasonably suspect reverse causality to a¤ect smallness, if population ‡ows were su¢ciently sensitive to tax di¤erentials that in practice smallness were to a signi…cant extent determined by tax burdens. We address this issue alternatively by replacing the population-based measure of smallness by its area-based equivalent (Table 4 , …rst data column), and by instrumenting smallness and its interaction term (second data column). Our qualitative results turn out not to be a¤ected. Point estimates on smallness and on the interaction terms of smallness with e  retain their signs but are larger in absolute value. The net e¤ect of smallness for Leviathan municipalities remains negative, which is consistent with strong Leviathan taming. This e¤ect is statistically signi…cant when we instrument for smallness. 31 A second extension is to augment our baseline speci…cation with instrumented centralization ratios (Table 4 , third and fourth data columns). Inclusion of this variable is not warranted by the theory, but we consider it by way of a robustness test and for comparability of our results to those of related empirical studies. While the coe¢cients on centralization themselves are not statistically signi…cant, the main e¤ect and the interaction e¤ect of smallness again retain their signs. Strong Leviathan taming continues to be supported. We therefore conclude that the centralism variable is not itself signi…cant and does not qualitatively change our results.
As a further robustness check, we estimate the baseline model using two-stage least squares, which remains unbiased in the presence of spatial autocorrelation in   but is less e¢cient than spatial GMM. The results are shown in Table 5 . Moran's , computed on the residuals and reported in the bottom row of Table 5 , strongly supports the presence of spatial error dependence, validating our choice of spatial GMM as the principal estimator. As expected, most coe¢cients are less precisely estimated with two-stage least squares than with spatial GMM. None of our qualitative results, however, depends on the choice of estimator: point estimates and standard errors are similar to those of our baseline regressions in Table 3 and to the additional speci…cation reported in Table 4 . We again …nd evidence that is consistent with strong Leviathan taming, which in two cases is statistically signi…cant.
Finally, we estimate the baseline model separately for the nine representative tax bases that underlie the construction of our tax indices. Although most municipalities decide on a single multiplier that shifts tax schedules symmetrically for all tax bases, it might be interesting to specify the regressions as if the municipal choices were independent across tax bases. Table   6 reports the main and interaction e¤ects of smallness and e  for the assembly and referendum de…nitions of e  respectively. We continue to …nd satisfactory statistics on overidentifying restrictions, but …rst-stage  tests suggest weak instrument problems for a majority of regression runs. The estimated coe¢cients for the three representative personal income taxes (which, we recall, account for about 70% of municipal tax revenues) are qualitatively similar.
They all suggest that vertical externalities dominate the tax choices of municipalities governed by citizens' assemblies, implying ine¢ciently high tax rates of relatively small municipalities, while the remaining (Leviathan) municipalities see their tax rates reduced by smallness, suggesting a salutary e¤ect of tax competition in their case. In …ve out of the six regression runs concerning tax rates on personal income, we …nd statistically signi…cant evidence of strong Leviathan taming, the sum of the coe¢cients on smallness and e *smallness being statistically signi…cantly negative. Interestingly, the most important of all the representative tax bases (married household with median income) provides the strongest evidence of strong Leviathan taming, with all three relevant coe¢cients having the appropriate signs as well as being statistically signi…cant ( statistics on main and interaction e¤ects of Smallness, and Wald statistic on the sum of the main + interaction e¤ects of smallness). 32 
Conclusions
In "Oates regressions", jurisdictional fragmentation is often found to be associated with lower tax rates. Traditionally, it has been di¢cult to read a clear interpretation into such results, because a negative partial correlation between fragmentation and tax rates could represent either (second-best e¢cient) Leviathan taming via horizontal tax competition, or a race to the bottom away from the socially optimal tax rates. This paper o¤ers a theory-driven empirical reassessment of Oates's approach.
We show that the interpretational ambiguity can be overcome when one considers a model of …scal federalism featuring vertical as well as horizontal tax externalities, and when one can draw on extraneous information on the democratic constraints on tax-setting authorities at the sub-federal level. According to the theory, tax-rate reducing competition among jurisdictions with some degree of Leviathan government behavior is welfare improving if, all else equal, competition among more benevolent jurisdictions would have raised equilibrium tax rates.
We employ data on tax setting in Swiss municipalities and cantons for an assessment of this prediction. A sizeable subsample of Swiss municipalities set tax rates by direct democratic participation of the citizenry, which constrains local executives to behave "benevolently". We …nd that, for these direct-democratic municipalities, the basic relationship between relative "smallness" and average tax rates is positive: the smaller they are, the higher their tax rates. This is consistent with dominant vertical externalities in a model of tax competition among benevolent jurisdictions in federal systems.
Our central …nding is that, other things equal, the relationship between fragmentation and tax rates turns negative (or at least not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero) for the municipalities with less direct democracy and more delegated …scal authority. Hence, we infer in this case that tax rates fall (or at least do not rise) in fragmentation because these municipalities o¤er some scope for Leviathan government behavior. Set against the theory, we can interpret this …nding not only as evidence of Leviathan taming via jurisdictional fragmentation but also as a manifestation of welfare-enhancing tax competition.
The ‡ip side of our central …nding, of course, is that the signi…cant impact of fragmentation on the taxes of direct-democratic municipalities implies welfare-reducing distortions from (vertical) tax externalities. Coordinated tax setting by benevolent governments remains the …rst-best policy. However, to the extent that there are constitutional or other limits on the feasibility of direct-democratic participation in sub-federal …scal policy making, our analysis suggests that the competitive pressures arising from sub-federal jurisdictional fragmentation are likely to be welfare enhancing.
How general is this result? As discussed above, the conditions for bene…cial tax competition seem if anything more likely to hold in many other contexts than our Swiss data set.
First, many real-world federations (e.g. US states or EU member countries) have considerably smaller sub-federal …scal shares than Swiss cantons, and thus even greater scope for dominant vertical tax externalities. 33 Second, given the pervasiveness of direct-democratic institutions in Switzerland, most sub-federal governments enjoy considerably greater leeway for revenue maximization than Swiss municipal authorities. Hence, there is reason to expect even greater scope for Leviathan-taming tax competition in many other federations.
Could this extrapolation from our data set be tested empirically? The critical component There are some evident limits to the generality of our study. By adopting a representativeagent framework with a single tax base, our analysis has abstracted from welfare e¤ects arising through Tiebout sorting, through policy interactions concerning multiple tax bases, through expenditure-side ine¢ciencies such as waste induced by red tape in large centralized bureaucracies, through di¤erential policy responses among jurisdictions of unequal intrinsic attractiveness to the mobile tax base, or through di¤erent forms of indirect democracy. 34 Moreover, explicit consideration of horizontal and vertical …scal transfers might be warranted in alterna-tive empirical settings.
A Appendix: A model of taxation in a …scal federation
A.1 Basic structure
Consider a federation with ¸1 states. Each state  is populated by   investor-…rms. 35 Hence, the federation's total population is given by
Investor-…rms determine the within-federation, per-…rm supply () and demand () of a perfectly mobile production factor. 36 Firms use an identical concave production technology  (  ), with  0  0 and  00 =   0, implying that the slope of the demand for capital does not depend on the tax rate. The net-of-tax rate of return  of the factor is determined in a federation-wide capital market. The factor is taxed by federal and state governments at rates  and   respectively, with   =  +   . We denote the vector of state tax rates by t, with elements   . The vector of equilibrium state tax rates is denoted by t ¤ . Pro…t maximization determines per-…rm capital demand   =  ( +   ), with  0  = 1. State 's aggregate capital demand is simply     . Rent, de…ned as the di¤erence between the value of production and the rental cost of capital,   =  (  ), is distributed to the resident investors.
Each investor is endowed with  units of , of which   is invested within the federation and the remainder is invested in the rest of the world (ROW). 37 Without loss of generality, returns in the ROW are normalized to zero. This implies that  can take negative values if the rate of return is lower in the federation than in the ROW.
Preferences over private goods are given by
where  (¢) is an increasing and concave function, implying a "home bias" in investment. Domestic and foreign incomes being considered as imperfect substitutes, di¤erences in the rate of return between the federation and the ROW can exist even with perfect capital mobility.
The investment decision implies per-investor capital supply   =  (), which turns out to be identical across states. Capital supply from state  is thus given by   . For analytical convenience, we assume that inward investment from outside the federation is zero. 38 Market clearing implies that
and determines the equilibrium rate of return in the federation. The e¤ect on the rate of return of a change in state 's tax rate is (using
where
 is the population share of state . Similarly, the e¤ect on  of a change in the tax rates of all states is
This implies that the change in the net-of-tax rate of return with respect to a change in one state's tax rate is independent of the distribution of the federal population among the other states (as the distribution of  6 = , does not feature in
). Publicly provided goods are produced with constant returns and distributed equally to all investor-…rms. No tax revenue is wasted. This implies per-capita budget constraints   =    ( +   ) for the state governments, and  =
Publicly provided goods enter agents' utility function. Total indirect utility for an investor in state  can be written as
where ¡ (  ; ) is increasing and concave in both arguments. 39 
A.2 Government preferences and citizen welfare
The existing literature identi…es two polar cases: benevolent governments and purely revenuemaximizing (Leviathan) governments. We assume that intermediate cases are also possible, and that state governments, to the extent that they are benevolent, only consider the utility of their own subjects. This is captured by the following per-capita objective function of state governments:
which nests the two polar scenarios as well as intermediate cases. 40 We allow the intensity of Leviathan preferences   to vary among states. For   = 0, the government's objective function coincides with the individual utility function of the state's residents, whereas   = 1 represents a pure Leviathan. 41 State governments maximize - taking into account agents' choices, factor-market clearing and the budget constraints. Using (4), and the fact that  0 = ¡, we can write the …rst-order condition, evaluated at equilibrium and implicitly determining state tax rates as
where 1 1+ =  0 (see (5)). This …rst-order condition implies
Hence, at equilibrium, tax revenues increase with a symmetric rise in states' tax rates. 42 Changes in equilibrium state tax rates are therefore monotonically related to changes in tax revenues and public spending. This implies that our empirical approach based on tax rates is consistent with Oates-type speci…cations, which use tax revenues or public spending as the endogenous variable. 3 9 A possible functional form is  = ( ¡ )
 , which we use for our simulations (see Appendix). We shall furthermore impose that  +    0, allowing us to use conventional functional forms without further transformations. 4 0 Note that the solution to the maximization problem of - is identical to that of the aggregate objective -, given that  is exogenous. 4 1 Keen (1998) combines benevolent and Leviathan motives by positing the objective function (1 ¡ )  ( +  ) + ¡ ( ), where () represents the citizens' utility from a private good and ¡() utility from the public goods. This setup could only be applied to our analysis if federal spending  were taken as fully exogenous, which would assume away vertical externalities. 4 2 Expression (8) is equivalent to expression (23) in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) .
Given the homogeneity of agents, social welfare is characterized by   . Analysis of the symmetric version of this model (e.g. by Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2004) has shown that, except for knife-edge con…gurations, independent state-level tax setting leads to socially suboptimal equilibrium state tax rates: a symmetric change in all tax rates can be welfare improving. The equivalent in our setup is a marginal change in t. Using the fact that, for state , the other states' tax rates enter the welfare function only indirectly via their e¤ect on , we can express the e¤ect of such a change as
For less than pure Leviathans (  1), subtracting (7) from (9) yields an expression that lends itself to economic interpretation:
The …rst set of brackets contains three terms. The …rst of these terms may be called a tax exporting e¤ect, due to the fact that in this setting, unlike in the symmetric model, capital supply and demand in state  are not necessarily equal. This e¤ect pushes equilibrium tax rates above or below the social optimum, depending on whether     or    . The second term represents the horizontal tax externality, arising from the interaction among state governments, and driving equilibrium tax rates below the social optimum. The third term represents the vertical tax externality, which results from the coexistence of the federal and the state governments. This e¤ect pushes equilibrium tax rates above the social optimum. Finally, the second brackets contain what we call the Leviathan e¤ect, representing the deviation from optimal revenue collection induced by Leviathan government preferences. The Leviathan e¤ect implies that the higher is   the greater is the scope for suboptimally high state tax rates.
A.3 State size
We are now in a position to study the e¤ect of a change in state size on the equilibrium state tax rate through a simple exercise in comparative statics. State size is our (inverse) measure of fragmentation. 44 We abstract from the impact of a small change in the size of one state   on the relative size of the other states ( 6 = » = 0).
Let H denote the system of …rst-order conditions characterized by (7), H  the Jacobian matrix with element   equal to 
Assuming that state taxes are strategic complements implies that all o¤-diagonal elements of the negative de…nite matrix H  are positive. Hence all elements of its inverse are negative. 45 4 3 The corresponding expression for pure Leviathans is:
? 0 4 4 The relationship between state size and fragmentation is discussed in Section 2.2. 4 5 See, for example, Wansbeek and Meijer (2000, Theorem A18). The assumption of strategic complementarity is supported by a large empirical literature on tax reaction functions (see Brueckner, 2003 , for a survey). Note that strategic complementarity is a su¢cient, but not necessary, condition for H ¡1  to be negative.
Concerning the sign of
, we can therefore concentrate on
This implies that the state tax rate may increase or decrease with state size. The net e¤ect depends on ² the balance between horizontal and vertical tax externalities (with dominant horizontal externalities strengthening the tendency for tax rates to rise with state size, and vice-versa for dominant vertical externalities), which can be gleaned through the correspondence of bracketed terms in (10) and (11), and ² the intensity of Leviathan preferences (with stronger Leviathan preferences strengthening the relative importance of vertical externalities).
The relationship between state size and equilibrium tax rates is interesting in itself and can be measured empirically. However, we ultimately strive for statements about welfare e¤ects of tax competition. This requires that we can establish a link between, on the one hand, the observable relationship between state size and the equilibrium tax rate (the "tax rate e¤ect of size"), and, on the other hand, the unobservable relationship between state size, the tax rate and welfare (the "welfare e¤ect of size"). Since relative state size serves as an inverse measure for the intensity of tax competition, the welfare e¤ect of size can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the desirability of tax competition. 46 The utility function (5) implies that welfare is not a¤ected by   directly but indirectly via the e¤ect of   on   . If we abstract from the determination of  by assuming that the federal tax rate is independent of the distribution of investor-…rms across states, the welfare e¤ect of a change in state 's size can then be written as
Thus, the welfare e¤ect of size is the product of (a) the derivative of state welfare relative to the vector of state tax rates and (b) the tax rate e¤ect of size, summed across all states of the federation.
It is not possible to derive a general analytical solution for the tax rate e¤ect of size, and hence for the welfare e¤ect of size. As a …rst stepping stone towards overcoming the impossibility of a general mapping from tax to welfare e¤ects, we can formally derive one speci…c but ultimately very helpful result: (10) and (11) imply that
, and the proposition follows. ¥ Proposition A1 is a stepping stone towards a unique mapping from the tax rate e¤ect of size to the welfare e¤ect of size, for the speci…c case where we compare jurisdictions of which some have higher   's than others, and where the tax rate e¤ect of size for the lower-  jurisdictions is negative (i.e. Proposition A1 holds for the more benevolent states).
Proposition A2 Suppose Proposition A1 holds for some interior value of   . Then there exists a pivotal value
Set (11) equal to 0 and the proposition follows. ¥ Both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are negative, such that
is low, and the scope for Leviathan-taming tax competition is large, when vertical externalities dominate horizontal externalities only relatively weakly. As can easily be gleaned from expression (12) , the relationship between the welfare e¤ect of size and the tax rate e¤ect of size in state  hinges on the derivative of state- welfare with respect to the vector of state- tax rates (   t ). If the sign of this derivative can be established, the sign of the relationship between the welfare e¤ect of size and the tax rate e¤ect of size is also determinate. Extensive simulations show that this is indeed possible for the precise scenario sketched above.
Speci…cally, we track the sign of t must be negative too. Since, for a given   , higher   implies upward pressure on   ,   t will then be also be negative for all      , ceteris paribus. If we thus were to observe that, at some higher value of   the tax rate e¤ect of size turns positive, this will imply a negative welfare e¤ect of size: tax competition will then be good for citizen welfare.
We can summarize this in the following conjecture.
Conjecture A1 Suppose Proposition A1 holds for   =   . Then
Hence, if the vertical tax externality dominates in a state under relatively benevolent government, then if a decrease in this state's size under a less benevolent government will lower equilibrium tax rates this decrease in state size increases welfare: tax competition is welfare improving.
In sum, if comparing two states that di¤er only in terms of their s, we observe that
e. the two observed states with di¤erent levels of  are on either side of the critical value, with the welfare consequences outlined in Conjecture A1.
B Appendix: Simulations
Some aspects of our model are not analytically tractable. Therefore, we perform a series of simulations.
Functional forms must be compatible with the assumptions made in the model. The production function used is
as the expression for aggregate indirect utility, which in turn determines the capital supply (   ), and, using capital demand,  0 . 49 Introducing the state government's objective function, using the budget constraints, we obtain
with the corresponding …rst-order condition   . The simulation exercise allows us to investigate whether the equilibrium tax rate can indeed be too high or too low ( For the parameters  and  we take 1 as the starting value and add increments of 1; whereas  takes on the values 0.05, 0.15, 0.25. The production function parameter  is set to 0.5, 1 and 1.5. For the parameters ,  and , which range between zero and one, the program starts at 0.3 with two increments of 0.3. We impose  = 0 as the starting value for the solution algorithm. This may be considered a natural starting point, as it implies that the federation rate of return equals that in the rest of the world. Some parameter combinations yield no solutions. Inspection of those cases shows that this occurs when the exogenous parameters are incompatible (high  and low  ). Furthermore, some solutions imply equilibrium state tax rate outside the plausible interval [0,1]. Since, these solutions correspond only to a small subset and (more importantly) conform with the patterns found for the plausible solutions, we do not report them separately. Cantonal tax index ( , instrumented) 033
Population of municipality ¡005
Share of mun. pop. under 20 028
Share of mun. pop. over 65 024
Area of municipality 010
Urban center dummy
Distance to freeway ¡006
Distance to airport
Harmonized-tax dummy
Number of observations 635 310 Wald  2 : Smallness main + interaction = 0 207 (n.a.) 1173 (n.a.) 1173 1st-stage  stat., Smalln. int'n.
(n.a.) 221 (n.a.) 221 Table 4 : Alternative tax index regressions (spatial GMM)
All regressions based on referendum de…nition (635 observations). Standard errors below coe¢cients. *** signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Two-tail P values below  2 and J statistics. Regressions include intercept and dummies for Geneva and Basel-Land. All variables mean-di¤erenced by year; non-dichotomous variables in natural logs. Instrument sets include variables listed in notes to Table 6 : Regressions for individual tax instruments (spatial GMM) Standard errors below coe¢cients. *** signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  2 statistics of Wald test of H0: Smallness main + interaction = 0; two-tail P values below. Non-reported controls are identical to Table  3 ; except harmonized-tax dummy, which is not included for personal taxes. Cantonal tax indices (T ) and other municipal tax indices ( b t  ) instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus identifying instruments (see notes to Table 3 ). First-stage F statistics robust to spatial autocorrelation. 
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